(gotovnost' prinimat') our culture and our values." 2 It thus expressed an explicit intention to cover a pragmatic need in Russia for qualified labor and for increasing its population, but also to allow people with a cultural attachment to Russia return to their "motherland". Thus, the program had a dual motivation: both to bring together the Russian nation, and to serve the 2 practical needs of the Russian labor market. Exactly how the relationship between these two motives should be understood was not clear.
Introduction
This paper studies the State program for voluntary resettlement of compatriots abroad 3 (the State program). It presents an outline of the program, its intentions and aims, including an analysis of how it was represented in the media in its period of revival from January 2012 to the middle of March 2015. In this period a number of changes were made to make the program more attractive, and the fact that the total number of participants rose dramatically increased its importance in a way that merits attention. The paper corroborates earlier research that points to an ambiguity in the term "compatriot" that allows the Russian authorities to use it for different political purposes 4 . It argues that in relation to the State program the Russian authorities rely heavily on pragmatic explanations for why they want to welcome "compatriots" for permanent residency -both in the program documents and the media representations of the program. Identity or ethno-cultural considerations are also present in the representations, but even in some of the newspaper articles where Russia is described as the historical motherland of the immigrants the pragmatic need for labor and for increasing the population is emphasized. It will be argued that although the term "compatriot" is used to "sell"/present them as desired immigrants and as "ours" to a population skeptical towards immigration, the Russian authorities also see a need to stress that their return to Russia is in Russia's pragmatic interest. The paper shows how the program and the concept of The paper first briefly presents theoretical debates on polices of inclusion and exclusion before it provides historical-political context for the State program. The program is then presented in detail followed by a section on methodological choices that introduces the main empirical part of the paper: a discourse analysis of media representations. I conclude that although the stated aims and purpose of the State program vary depending on what discourse it is part of, a pragmatic discourse on compatriots as skilled labor is generally present in the representations.
Citizenship and migration policy
In a world of migration, states have become increasingly concerned with defining who is eligible to become their citizens. Although many contemporary polities mostly seem and migration, but simultaneously, domestic forces, out of self-interest, may push the same governments towards greater closure 6 . In other words, states need immigration, but as immigration potentially creates discontent among the local population they have to calibrate their policies carefully.
Bridget Anderson 7 argues that "modern states portray themselves not as arbitrary collections of people hung together by a common legal status, but as a community of value, composed of people who share common ideals and (exemplary) patterns of behavior expressed through ethnicity, religion, culture, or language -that is, its members have shared values." This community is delimited on the outside by the non-citizens and inside the borders of the state by "failed citizens", that is, criminals, drug addicts and others who do not fulfill the criteria of being "good citizens" sharing the values of the community. The ways in which non-citizens may become citizens therefore not only reflect legal technicalities but tell us something about how membership and statehood of specific states and their national identities are imagined. 8 The model of nation-state membership -a homogenous nation within the borders of a country -is in itself ambivalent to the admission of immigrants to citizenship, and the nation-state as such is "a figment of the sociological imagination". 9 In his seminal work Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany Roger Brubaker claimed that states are unequally disposed to accept immigrants as citizens because they are formed under particular historical circumstances shaped by their historic origins. 10 Moreover, the conception of national identity prevailing in a state will have an effect on citizenship rules. Until recently Germany represented an ethnic model where membership was based on common descent, language and culture, whereas France represented a civic or republican model where the nation was defined as a political community based on a constitution, laws and citizenship. The latter was more inclusive to immigrants, not only to people of similar ethnic origin.
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The citizenship regimes of most states do not fit squarely into one model or the other, but using the distinctions that Brubaker's model provides as a theoretical framework may be of value. Other scholars have shown how states change their citizenship policies according to the current situation and needs. 12 In relation to immigrants, citizenship has at least two different meanings: "as a legal status, citizenship denotes formal membership (nationality)" and "as an identity, citizenship refers to the shared understandings and practices that constitute a political community." 13 The identity aspect has an impact on who has access to citizenship. National identity considerations (the predominant image of the nation and the boundaries of the imagined "we") have proved to be crucial in the shaping of citizenship policy also in Russia. 14 However, as this article shows, these policies seem, at least rhetorically, simultaneously to be driven to a large extent by practical economic and security concerns.
Citizenship and migration policy in the Russian Federation
The citizenship and migration policy in the Russian Federation is undergoing rapid changes.
According to Konstantin Romodanovskiǐ, head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), there has been a switch to a migration policy that focuses more on "quality than quantity". 15 Since the early 2000s Russia has seen a large influx of temporary labor migration from former Soviet republics, especially the economically struggling Central Asian states Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but also from Ukraine -whose citizens are often seen as "most favored" labor migrants due to their similar ethnic origins and their fluency in Russian. At the present moment, however, access to the Russian labor market for citizens from many postSoviet republics has become stricter. Whereas CIS citizens 16 could formerly enter Russia freely on their internal passports, since January 2015 entrance is possible on external passports only. 17 Since 2015 a certificate of knowledge of Russian language, history and legislation is required for foreigners to acquire a work permit, residence permit, and citizenship. Exceptions are made for highly qualified specialists, participants in the State program and a few other categories.
Russia is in need of workers. The number of people entering working age does not balance those who exit it. 18 The Russian state has therefore stated as a priority goal to increase its population, also through migration. The 2007 Demographic policy concept 19 singles out citizens of other post-Soviet states as subjects of special interest to Russia when it comes to increasing the population to 145 million people by 2025. 20 Facilitating and stimulating resettlement of compatriots to Russia for permanent residency is listed as one of the main tasks in the Concept for state migration policy until 2025. 21 The Migration policy concept reflects a shift to a more pragmatic and differentiated migration policy, for instance with plans to implement a "'points system' 22 for deciding who will get permanent residency status in the country", "simplified access to citizenship for entrepreneurs, investors, qualified specialists and their families…" and "differentiated programs for short and long term labor migration…for instance programs that attract highly qualified specialists and qualified workers in professions needed on the Russian labor market." 23 The attitude of Russian citizens towards immigration has been shown to be quite negative and is likely to have an impact on migration policy. According to a survey conducted by the AllRussian centre for public opinion (VTSIOM) in 2013 they think that immigrants bring more problems than positive effects to the country. Two thirds of the respondents believed that increased numbers of immigrants lead to more crime and corruption, and 56% agreed that immigration increases competition on the labor market. However, most Russian citizens (58%) supported the idea that Russian and Russian speaking immigrants should be accepted even if the entry of other ethnic groups to the country should be limited. 58% supported the entry of young and educated people and agreed that the entry of people unable to work or with a low level of education should be restricted (53%).
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In 2015 the Levada centre found that xenophobic sentiments in Russian society had decreased compared to the previous two years. Their sociologist, Karina Pipiya, explained that this did not reflect a more tolerant Russian society, but rather showed that Russian citizens' attention had been redirected towards other topics such as the Ukraine crisis and the political conflict with the West. "The national sentiments are in a 'dormant mode', people had not become more loyal." 25 In the 2015 survey 65% of the respondents were of the opinion that the settlement of some ethnic groups (tekh ili inykh natsii) in Russia should be restricted. This was a quite significant number, although lower than the result in 2013 when 81% agreed with this statement. The concept of "Russia for Russians" was supported by 51% of the respondents in 2015 whereas in 2013 66% had been supportive of this slogan. Until changes were introduced in the program in 2012/ 2013, compatriots had to find and fill specific vacancies before they were allowed to move to Russia. Its new incarnation, however, also welcomes applications from people already living in Russia. Students enrolled at Russian universities as well as people planning to start their own business there may apply. The new program also allows the compatriots to bring not only their spouses, but also parents, siblings and children. What further makes the program more attractive is the fact that the understanding of the "territory of settlement" has been widened. Whereas previously the compatriots were bound to a particular administrative district within a Federal Subject, they may now search for work in places of their own choice within the entire Federal Subject.
In addition to providing temporary residence permits outside of the set quotas for labor, the new program, like the old one, gives simplified access to Russian citizenship. Participants are exempted from three of the provisions in article 13 of the law "On citizenship in the RF":
They do not have to live 5 years in Russia in order to apply for citizenship and there is no requirement that they must know Russian or that they can document a legal source of income to provide for their living. 36 Whether there in fact is no requirement in all cases is impossible to say, but in the process of selecting participants these provisions make it possible for the authorities to accept people with other qualities on an individual basis. Perhaps more importantly, the regions develop their own programs and determine their own selection Apart from the use of the word "compatriot", whose meaning will be elaborated on below, the criteria of acceptance are thus quite pragmatic, stressing employment or employment prospects as a prerequisite. According to the program document, those who have already proved to be suitable workers may stay, and those whose qualification and skills suit the need of the region may come.
The State program gives participants benefits such as free travel to Russia, a monthly allowance for up to 6 months in case of unemployment, compensation for expenses related to the resettlement process, and so on 38 In the application form information about age and education level is asked for, and there are also questions about "nationality" (ethnicity) and religious affiliation. Answering the two latter questions is voluntary, and whether or not they have implications for who is accepted, is impossible to say. Who exactly the program is directed at is unclear, largely due to the many potential interpretations of the word "compatriot".
Compatriots as institutionalized ambiguity
Already in a study from 1998 on migration, displacement and identity in Post-Soviet Russia, Hilary Pilkington 39 noticed that in Russian newspapers the term "compatriots" 
Discourse analysis and selection of data
In this paper the term "discourse" is defined as framings of phenomena that are maintained through communicative practices. 45 A discourse on a subject is formed through repeated articulations that contain positions on what constitutes the relevant facts and correct interpretations regarding the phenomenon. The sum of all discourses that are identified as competing with each other for dominance within a debate, is referred to as "the order of discourse". 46 "By concentrating on the different, competing discourses within the same domain, it is possible to investigate where a particular discourse is dominant, where there is a struggle between different discourses, and which common-sense assumptions are shared by all the prevailing discourses." 47 The point of departure for any discourse analysis is that discursive accounts of reality have real social consequences. "…the discourses, by representing reality in one particular way rather than in other possible ways, constitute subjects and objects in particular ways, create boundaries between the true and the false, and make certain types of action relevant and others unthinkable. It is in this sense that discourse is constitutive of the social." 48 Discourse theory uses the notion "floating signifiers" 49 for elements that are especially flexible when it comes to expressing different meanings. "Floating signifiers" are signs that different discourses compete over to fill with content. 50 In this paper I see the concept of "compatriot"
as a floating signifier, whose content seems to be adjusted and altered according to which discourse it is a part of.
For the purposes of this study a corpus of texts has been retrieved from two media outlets in the period from January 2012 to mid. The corpus of texts consists of a mixture of printed opinions, expert accounts, and general news reports. The authors are not only journalists working in the newspaper or the news agency; other voices are also allowed to come to the fore in both RG and Regnum. Both news outlets quote state officials quite extensively, and the general impression is that the opinions or information they give is seldom challenged. Although a close scrutiny of the articles shows a clear tendency to emphasize the pragmatic justification of the program, 54 who the compatriots are depends to a large extent on how the concept "compatriot" is recontextualized in the media reports. This is discussed in more detail below. to Russia are framed not only as a beneficial policy with regard to demography and economic development. Representatives of the state also frame it in terms of a duty of the motherland to welcome "compatriots" home.
An understanding of a "compatriot" (compatriot abroad) as a person for whom Russia is their "historical motherland", is repeatedly transmitted through the texts. There are several examples that confirm that being born in Russia is not a prerequisite for Russia being someone's "historical motherland". On 2 February 2012 58 RG carried a report about a group of "Old Believers" from Latin America who had "returned to the motherland of their ancestors". In the 1920s their relatives had fled from the revolution, crossed the ocean, and settled in the new continent. The text did not give any information about why they chose to go to Russia, or whether they speak Russian. The fact that they are "compatriots" remained unquestioned: "The authorities in Ussuriĭsk are hoping that the hard-working and sober compatriots will help to revive agriculture in the area." 59 RG further reports that according to the Russian embassy in Bolivia, one thousand Old Believers from Latin America are planning to settle in Primorskii region. 60 The emphasis on the "compatriots" as hard-working as well as the fact that they are supposed to revive the agriculture in the area shows that their presence is also perceived as being in Russia's pragmatic interest.
In Under the headline "The resettlement program for compatriots does not work because it is unclear who are counted as compatriots -opinion," 64 Regnum printed an article by Rais Suleǐmanov, head of a center for regional and ethno-religious research in the Volga region.
Suleǐmanov criticizes the term "compatriot" for being interpreted so broadly that "all CIS citizens may be considered eligible for participation in the program," and "native inhabitants (korennie zhiteli) of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and so on may simply come here as compatriots."
He stated that this confusion made society skeptical towards this "without any doubt necessary project." It was therefore necessary to limit "the understanding of 'our people'
(who as a result of the breakup of the USSR remained in [other parts of the USSR]) to those who are capable of simplified naturalization in Russia, which they see as their historical motherland." Suleǐmanov further complained that (ethnic) Russians from Tashkent or Dushanbe had met so complicated procedures in Russia "that it made others lose their wish to return to the motherland." 65 Although in these representations national identity considerations are clearly important, we note that in some of them the pragmatic economic aspect is also emphasized.
Migrant vs. Compatriot/"pereselenets"
The compatriots (sootechestvenniki) who move to Russia are often referred to by the Russian word "pеrеselentsy" (pl.). This is perhaps due to the name of the State program, which uses the related noun "pereselenie" for "resettlement". Normally the word "pereselenets" (sg.) is translated into English as "migrant", "immigrant," or "emigrant". The Russian prefix "pere" signifies movement from one place to another and is used in the verb "to move"/"resettle" -"pereselit'sia". "pereselenets" shares the root "sel" with the verb "selit'sia", which means "to settle". Literally -a person who has moved somewhere to settle down. According to Ozhegov's Russian dictionary "pereselenets" means either a person who is settling down in a place where people did not live before, or a person who has temporarily resettled. When used in relation to the State program, though, it often seems to designate someone who has come to Russia for permanent residency and citizenship.
The word "migrant" is also used in Russian. This is the term used for labor migrants -"trudovye migranty" -and "illegal migrants" -"nelegal'nye migranty" or "nelegaly". It has many negative connotations as it is often used in relation to crime committed by foreigners, to low paid, illegal work, and to low levels of education. In discourses on migration, the term "migrant" is also used about bona fide Russian citizens who belong to certain ethnic groups, especially citizens from the North Caucasus, who many Russians regard as undesirable migrants when they move outside "their own" Federal Subjects. This must partly be blamed on the Soviet legacy of "titular nationalities," 66 still used to name many Federal Subjects (Chechen republic, Tatarstan, Chuvashia etc.). 67 In relation to the State program it is interesting to observe that "migrant" is seldom used about "compatriots", and if it is, then it is used together with "compatriots" and "pereselentsy", simply as a means of varying the language, while it is specified what kind of migrants they are. In a Regnum report from In several of the examined texts the two terms "migrant" and "compatriot" are juxtaposed, underlining that "compatriots" are not "migrants" in the established negative way. A comment from Gennadiǐ Shabaev, a Communist Party (KPRF) representative in Bashkiriia (the Republic of Bashkortostan) is striking:
"We need to bring back to Bashkiriia from the CIS countries and Central Asia our compatriots:
Russians, Tatars, Bashkirs and representatives of other nationalities who traditionally and for centuries lived in this territory… These people, in contrast to migrants, share our common culture and our spiritual values." 69 Here, the author embraces a multi-ethnic understanding of "the nation", although leaving out "migrants" as people who do not "traditionally" belong.
In passport is fully justified." 72 Zharikhin thus seemed to draw a quite clear distinction between "ours" and "others".
Academy of Sciences, Vladimir Zorin, "A migrant should know the language and the legislation, the history, and the culture of the recipient country. First and foremost because he is then better protected, he is more difficult to fool and trick into 'grey schemes'. Secondly, being familiar with the historical and cultural roots [of the country] and living according to them, he will 'fit' better into the collective of workers and will annoy his neighbors less."
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The fact that participants in the State program are exempted from the tests in Russian language, history, and legislation puts them in a different position than other immigrants. The label "compatriot" in a way serves to certify them as "ours", be it through their ancestors' ties to Russia, their commitment to Russian language and culture, or their professional skills.
It ought to be mentioned that the debates are not unambiguously critical towards temporary labor migration. When RG reported on a suggestion from a Liberal-Democratic party (LDPR)
Duma deputy to halt all labor migration (work permits to foreigners) for the next five years with the exception of highly qualified specialists and "compatriots", the newspaper was very critical of this suggestion: "That migrants are necessary for the Russian economy is recognized at the highest level of the state. This is written in the migration policy concept, which is written by the best experts in the country and signed by the president." . 75 Romodanovskiǐ was quoted as stressing that "it is important that those who are needed come, and even more important that they do not leave again." In the same text it is stated that "speaking of migration in general, the number of foreigners entering Russia has decreased by 20% in one year. According to Romodanovskiǐ, 'that is noticeable, not only in the system [it is unclear what system he was speaking of] and the streets but in the numbers of crimes that we are detecting.'" 76 Thus, fewer foreign migrants equals less crime, whereas more compatriots equals more skilled and needed workers.
Compatriots as skilled labor
Regnum has printed frequent reports on the regional resettlement programs. These texts are The regional accounts in Regnum further confirm the assumption that historical belonging and emotional affiliation with Russia is not enough to be considered a "compatriot". In a report from Kursk region the local head of the FMS said that in the space of five months they had accepted 869 applications through the State program and declined 58. The reasons named for rejection were lack of professional skills, low levels of education and qualifications, having reached retirement age, and lack of relevant vacancies. 81 Being a "compatriot" historically and culturally does not necessarily guarantee participant status in the State program. The regions are free to set their own criteria and select suitable "compatriots" accordingly.
It should be noted that although some texts very much give the impression that thousands of compatriots are ready to move to Russia, more skeptical voices are also heard. Igor' Pavlovskiǐ, the head of a working group for cooperation with compatriots abroad in Leningrad region and at the same time deputy director of the Regnum news agency, was asked why the State program, before its revival, had not worked. The main reason that he noted was that the compatriots are not guaranteed a job in Russia; in addition he mentioned that there are large differences in housing prices. The program did not work because "no matter how bad the life situation of a compatriot is abroad, his stable instability is better than guaranteed instability in Russia." 82 In another interview, an "expert on Central Asia" said to Regnum that "In order [to convince] 'smart' and 'educated' people to go to Russia, the country will not only have to ease the access to citizenship but to attract 'brains' by means of high wages and other benefits.
At the moment 'brains' are not sufficiently appreciated, and that's why they 'drain' to the West." 83 Thus, the texts give no unequivocal narrative of Russia as a great and attractive country for resettlement. Both RG and Regnum open their columns to a more complex picture.
Inter-ethnic relations
The Russian language uses two adjectives with different meanings where in English we have only one word, "Russian." "Rossiǐskiǐ" underlines "Russia" as a state, a civic entity, whereas "russkiǐ" is used when "Russian" expresses cultural-ethnic identity. There are also two concepts signifying the Russian people; "rossiiane" -all citizens of Russia (all nationalities living within the borders of the Russian Federation), and "russkie" -the ethnic Russians.
Research has shown that while some readers in 2006 understood "rossiiane" to mean "all citizens of Russia", others interpreted the meaning as identical to "russkie", that is, ethnic
Russians. 84 In the discourses revolving around the State program "rossiǐskiǐ" is normally used when "compatriot" is accompanied by an adjective. "Russian" as an ethnic category, however, is also present in the debates. Regnum in relation to Ukrainian citizens, interchangeably referred to as "refugees", "Ukrainian citizens", "pereselentsy"/immigrants and "compatriots".
In March, before pro-Russian protesters took over administrative buildings in Eastern Ukraine and the conflict escalated into war 91 , RG reported that the Russian border control had recorded more than 700 thousand Ukrainian citizens coming to Russia since the beginning of the year 92 .
Romodanovskiǐ, head of the FMS, commented on the numbers as follows: "Without doubtthis is not economic migration, this is due to a fire in our neighbor's house"…"We can speak of symptoms of an impending humanitarian catastrophe". In the same text it was noted that "the regional authorities are preparing to meet the Ukrainian brothers in a worthy manner if this becomes necessary." From this account it becomes evident that Yamal already has a Ukrainian minority who is regarded as "yamal'tsy", thus, they are "ours" at the same time as Ukrainians are recognized as one people (narod). In the texts examined Russia is never spoken of as the Ukrainians' "historical motherland", but Ukrainians are several times referred to as "brothers" or citizens from a "brother state" (bratskoe gosudarstvo). In an interview with RG, where Romodanovskiǐ assured the readers that access to Russian citizenship is already simplified for Ukrainians and that they have various possibilities to formalize a prolonged stay in Russia, he added: "After all, they are practically our relatives (rodnye lyudi). Therefore this is almost internal migration." As this study shows, there is no unequivocal understanding of who the "compatriots" are, and the criteria for being a "compatriot" change from one text to another. In some texts, having
Russia as the historical motherland is presented as sufficient for gaining "compatriot" status.
Old Believers from Latin America and Cherkess from Syria, whose ancestors at some point in history lived in Russia, apply to come to Russia under the program. Although this criterion of "historical belonging" opens up the State program to all people with blood ties to the multiethnic Russian Federation, other texts directly or more implicitly give a narrower interpretation of the "compatriots" as ethnic Russians or even as working age people with professional skills needed in particular regions. Although to welcome compatriots who feel that they belong in Russia is sometimes framed as a duty of the motherland, an articulated need to resettle compatriots for demographic and labor market reasons is expressed more frequently.
One way of delimiting something is to contrast it with what it is not. The repeated dichotomy between "migrant" and "compatriot" in the texts is telling; "compatriots" are not "migrants" in the established negative sense, on the contrary, they are desired potential citizens. In the section on inter-ethnic relations above it became evident that some participants in this discourse have clear perceptions about which ethnicities should not be covered by the "compatriot" label. For instance, this is normally the case with the titular groups in most postSoviet states, including states that supply much of the labor migration to Russia. These groups, it is reasoned, do not have Russia as their "motherland" since they have "a state of their own". However, although it is not explicitly stated that refugees from Ukraine have Russia as their historical motherland, they are without any doubt regarded as "compatriots", and the State program is framed as a favorable way for them to gain citizenship and inclusion in the Russian society and labor market. 
